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Abstract—This paper presents a new framework of identifying
a series of cyber data attacks on power system synchrophasor
measurements. We focus on detecting “unobservable” cyber data
attacks that cannot be detected by any existing method that
purely relies on measurements received at one time instant. Lever-
aging the approximate low-rank property of phasor measurement
unit (PMU) data, we formulate the identification problem of
successive unobservable cyber attacks as a matrix decomposition
problem of a low-rank matrix plus a transformed column-
sparse matrix. We propose a convex-optimization-based method
and provide its theoretical guarantee in the data identification.
Numerical experiments on actual PMU data from the Central
New York power system and synthetic data are conducted to
verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Index Terms—cyber data attacks, low-rank matrix, matrix de-
composition, synchrophasor measurements.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE integration of cyber infrastructures into future smartgrids greatly enhances the monitoring, dispatch, and
scheduling of power systems. Such integration, however,
makes the power systems more susceptible to cyber attacks. It
is reported that cyber spies have penetrated U.S. electrical grid
[26]. Researchers have also launched an experimental cyber
attack that caused a generator to self-destruct [15].
State estimation [1] is a critical component of power system
monitoring. System state is estimated based on the obtained
measurements across the system. Bad data can affect the state
estimation and mislead the system operator. Many efforts have
been devoted to develop methods that can identify bad data,
see e.g., [6], [14], [25], [27], [35].
Cyber data attacks (firstly studied in [23]) can be viewed as
“the worst interacting bad data injected by an adversary”[18].
Malicious intruders with system configuration information
can simultaneously manipulate multiple measurements so that
these attacks cannot be detected by any bad data detector.
Because the removal of affected measurements would make
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the system unobservable, these attacks are termed as “unob-
servable attacks”1 in [18].
State estimation in the presence of cyber data attacks has
attracted much research attention recently [3], [9], [18], [22],
[23], [29]–[31]. Existing approaches include protecting a small
number of key measurement units such that the intruders
cannot inject unobservable attacks without hacking protected
units [3], [9], [17], as well as detectors designed for attacks
in the observable regime [18]. The research on the detec-
tion of unobservable attacks is still limited. Refs. [22], [30]
proposed different methods to detect unobservable attacks in
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system.
The method in [30] relies critically on the assumption that the
measurements at different time instants are i.i.d. samples of
random variables. This assumption might not hold when the
system is under disturbance. Ref. [22] focused on the scenarios
that an intruder attacks a different set of measurements at
each time instant, and no theoretical analysis of the detection
performance is provided in [22].
This paper considers cyber data attacks to PMU mea-
surements. It focuses on the case when an intruder injects
unobservable data attacks to the same set of PMUs constantly.
Because PMUs under attack do not provide any accurate
measurement at any time instant to the operator, the attack
identification in this case is very challenging and has not
been addressed before. We propose a method that can identify
the successive unobservable cyber data attacks and provide
the theoretical guarantee even when the system is under
disturbance. The intuition is that even though an intruder can
constantly inject data attacks that are consistent with each
other at each time instant, as long as the intruder does not
know the system dynamics, one can identify the attacks by
comparing time series of different PMUs and locating the
PMUs that exhibit abnormal dynamics.
Because PMU measurements are synchronized and corre-
lated, the high-dimensional PMU data matrix exhibits low-
rank property [7], [8], [12], [33]. We formulate the identifica-
tion problem as a matrix decomposition problem of a low-
rank matrix plus a transformed column-sparse matrix. The
matrix decomposition problem has attracted much research
attention recently, see e.g., [4], [5], [28], [34], and have wide
applications in areas like Internet monitoring [19], [24], [32],
1The term “unobservable” is used in this sense throughout the paper.
medical imaging [10], [11], and image processing [2]. The
situation that one component is a transformed column-sparse
matrix, however, has not been addressed before.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. (1) We propose
the idea of exploiting spatial-temporal correlations in PMU
measurements to identify unobservable data attacks. (2) We
formulate the identification problem into a matrix decomposi-
tion problem and propose a computationally efficient method
that does not require the modeling of power system dynamics.
(3) We provide theoretical guarantees of attack detection, as
well as the general matrix decomposition problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We formulate
our problem and point out its connection to other applications
in Section II. We describe our detection method and analyze
its theoretical guarantee with both noiseless (Section III)
and noisy measurements (Section IV). Section V records our
numerical experiments. We conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RELATED WORK
A. Low-rankness of PMU measurements
Consider a n-bus power grid with PMUs installed on
some buses. Let p denote the total number of PMU channels
that measure bus voltage and line current phasors2. Phasors
are expressed in Cartesian coordinates throughout the paper.
Matrix M ∈ Ct×p contains the collected phasor measurements
in t synchronized time instants. J¯ ∈ [[p]] denotes the set
of PMU channels that are under data attacks. The observed
measurement matrix can be presented as
M = L¯+ D¯ +N, (1)
where L¯ ∈ Ct×p represents the actual phasors without data
attacks, D¯ ∈ Ct×p represents the additive errors introduced
by an intruder, and N represents the measurement noise.
High-dimensional PMU data matrices exhibit low-rank
property [7], [8], [12], [33]. We analyzed actual PMU data
from six multi-channel PMUs deployed in the Central New
York (NY) Power System (Fig. 1). Six PMUs measure twenty-
three voltage and current phasors, and the data rate is thirty
samples per second per channel. Fig. 2 shows the current
magnitudes of PMU data in twenty seconds. An event occurs
around 2.5s. The obtained data are collected into a 600× 23
matrix. Fig. 3 plots the singular values of the matrix with the
ten largest ones being 832.8, 194.8, 35.1, 18.1, 4.3, 2.5, 2.1,
1.3, 1.2, 0.5. Therefore, we can approximate the 600 × 23
matrix by a low-rank matrix with little approximation error.
The Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of L¯ is
L¯ = U¯Σ¯V¯ †, (2)
where U¯ ∈ Ct×r, Σ¯ ∈ Cr×r, V¯ ∈ Cp×r (r ≪ t, p). We
assume throughout the paper that nonzero columns of D¯ do not
lie in the column space of L¯ (D¯ 6= U¯ U¯ †D¯). It is a legitimate
assumption when the intruders do not have full information
about the system dynamics. The notations are summarized
in Table I. Matrix A is column-sparse if it contains a small
fraction of non-zero columns. We call the set of indices of
nonzero columns the column support of A.
2In three phase AC systems, a phasor is defined as a complex number that
represents both the magnitude and phase angle of the sinusoidal waveforms.
Fig. 1: PMUs in the Central NY Power System. (Circles and
lines represent buses and transmission lines. A PMU measures
the voltage phasor and the incident current phasors of the bus
where it is located.)
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Fig. 2: Visualization of Partial PMU data (Magnitude of nine
current phasors)
B. Unobservable cyber data attacks and problem formulation
We use bus voltage phasors as state variables, and let
X ∈ Ct×n contain the state variables at t instants. We use the
π equivalent model to represent a transmission line (Fig. 4).
Zij and Y ij denote the impedance and admittance of the
transmission line between bus i and bus j. Current Iij from
bus i to bus j is related to bus voltage V i and V j by
Iij =
V i − V j
Zij
+ V i
Y ij
2
. (3)
We define W¯ ∈ Cp×n as follows. If the kth PMU chan-
nel measures the voltage phasor of bus j, W¯kj = 1; if
it measures the current phasor from bus i to bus j, then
W¯ki = 1/Z
ij + Y ij/2, W¯kj = −1/Zij; W¯kj = 0 otherwise.
The PMU measurements and the state variables are related by
L¯ = XW¯T . (4)
The attack at time t, denoted by data injection D¯t,:, is called
unobservable3 if and only if
D¯t,: = c
tW¯T (5)
holds for some nonzero row vector ct ∈ C1×n. In this case,
L¯t,: + D¯t,: = (Xt,: + c
t)W¯T , (6)
and the operator would have the wrong impression that the
state is Xt,: + ct. We focus on the cases that the attacks from
time 1 to t are all unobservable4, then we have
D¯ =


c1
.
.
.
ct

 W¯T := C¯WT , (7)
3[23] focuses on DC model where power measurements and state variables
are approximately related by linear equations. Here PMU measurements and
state variables are accurately related by linear equation (4).
4 Our detection method can be extended to cases that both unobservable
and observable attacks exist. See the beginning of Section III-A
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Fig. 3: Singular values of PMU data matrix in decreasing order
TABLE I: Notations
Ai, Ai,: the ith column and the ith row of matrix A, respectively.
AI the submatrix of A with column indices in set I .
A‡, A† the conjugate and conjugate transpose matrix of A.
PI(A) matrix obtained from A by setting Ai to zero for all i /∈ I .
A ∈ PI if and only if PI(A) = A.
‖A‖, ‖A‖F the spectral and Frobenius norm of A, respectively.
‖A‖∗ the nuclear norm of A, which is the sum of singular values.
‖A‖1,2 the sum of ℓ2 norms of the columns of A.
‖A‖∞,2 the largest ℓ2 norm of the columns.
PU (A) := UU
†A, the projection of A onto the column space of L.
PV (A) := AV V
†
, the projection of A onto the row space.
PT (·) := PU (·) + PV (·)−PUPV (·).
PU⊥ (A) := (I − UU
†)A.
PV⊥ (A) := A(I − V V
†).
PT⊥ (A) := PU⊥PV ⊥(A).
A ∈ PT if and only if PT (A) = A.
Ic the complimentary set of set I .
where Wj = W¯j/‖W¯j‖. C¯ represents the additive error (up
to a scaling factor) to bus voltages due to data attacks, i.e.,
‖W¯j‖C¯j is the error to bus voltage V j . Let I¯ ∈ [[n]] denote the
column support of C¯. We assume C¯ is column-sparse because
intruders might only alter some of the state variables due to
resource constraints. With increasing installation of PMUs,
we anticipate that the total number of PMU channels p will
be larger than the number of buses n. The transform in (7)
reduces the degree of freedom in D¯. Combining (1) and (7),
the obtained measurements under attack can be written as
M = L¯+ C¯WT +N. (8)
The attack identification problem is formulated as follows.
Given M and W , is it possible to separate L¯ and C¯? We
assume noise level is bounded and given, i.e., ‖N‖F ≤ η.
We say a method can identify an unobservable attack if it
successfully determines the set of PMU channels that are under
attack and recovers measurements that are not attacked.
Although cannot be detected at a given time instant, the
unobservable attacks can be detected if the time series in the
affected PMU channels exhibit dynamics different from those
of unaffected PMUs. Mathematically, the matrix decomposi-
tion is possible if columns in D¯ do not belong to the column
space of L¯.
We use a three-bus network (Fig. 5) to illustrate the nota-
tions. Let Vi and Iij (i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) in Ct×1 denote the bus
voltages and line currents in t instants. Then
L¯ = [V1 I12 I13 V2 I21 I23] = [V1 V2 V3]W¯T (9)
Fig. 4: π model of a transmission line
Fig. 5: Three-bus example. PMUs are installed at bus 1 and bus
2 measuring the corresponding voltage phasors and incident
line current phasors.
where W¯T is
 1 1Z12 + Y
12
2
1
Z13
+ Y
13
2 0 − 1Z12 0
0 − 1
Z12
0 1 1
Z12
+ Y
12
2
1
Z23
+ Y
23
2
0 0 − 1
Z13
0 0 − 1
Z23

 .
Suppose the intruder manipulates measurements in all chan-
nels of PMU 1 and the channel of PMU 2 that measures I21
and I23 so that the system operator would have the wrong
impression that the system states are [V1 + β1 V2 V3 + β2]
for any nonzero β1, β2 ∈ Ct×1. In this case, the observed
measurements under attacks when there is no noise are
M = [V1 + β1 V2 V3 + β2]W¯T
= [V1 + β1 I12 +
β1
Z12
+
β1Y 12
2
I
13 +
β1 − β2
Z13
+
β1Y 13
2
V
2
I
21 − β1/Z12 I23 − β2/Z23]. (10)
The additive errors due to attacks are
D¯ = [β1 0 β2]W¯T = [‖W¯1‖β1 0 ‖W¯3‖β2]WT . (11)
C. Connections to existing work
The detection of unobservable cyber data attacks has not
been much addressed. [30] and [22] considered the detection
of unobservable attacks to SCADA data and provided numer-
ical results. [30] assumes the measurements across time are
i.i.d. distributed and detects the attacks based on statistical
learning. [22] assumes the SCADA measurements under DC
power flow model are low-rank and proposes to detect the
attacks by decomposing a low-rank matrix and a sparse matrix
from their sum. Our work differs from [22] in that we assume
the intruder constantly injects data attacks to the same set
of PMUs, while [22] assumes the intruder attacks different
PMUs at different time instants. Furthermore, we provide the
theoretical guarantee of our detection method.
Our problem formulation of matrix decomposition is closely
related to those in [34] and [24]. When W is an identity
matrix, our problem reduces to the one in [34]. The difference
Method 1 Unobservable cyber attack identification method
Input: PMU measurements M in t instants; coefficient η; the
set Ω of the locations (i, j) of the observed entries.
Find (L∗, C∗), the optimum solution to the following
optimization problem
min
L∈Ct×p,C∈Ct×n
‖L‖∗ + λ‖C‖1,2 (12)
s.t.
∑
i,j∈Ω
|Mij − Lij − (CWT )ij |2 ≤ |Ω|
tp
η2 (13)
Compute the SVD of L∗ = U∗Σ∗V ∗†.
Find column support of D∗ = C∗WT , denoted by J ∗.
Return: L∗, C∗, L∗J ∗c , U∗ and J ∗.
between our model and the one in [24] is that the sparse matrix
C¯ in [24] has nonzero entries located independent of each
other, while C¯ here is a column-sparse matrix. Our method
and analysis are built up those in [34], but we consider a
more general framework of matrix decomposition through the
introduction of the transform matrix W .
The significance of our work is twofold. First, we for the
first time consider the case that the additive error matrix D¯ can
be dense (i.e., W is a dense matrix), while the error matrices
in [34] and [24] are sparse. We show through both theoretical
analysis and numerical experiments that it is possible to
achieve matrix decomposition with dense D¯. Second, when
D¯ is a column-sparse matrix itself (i.e., W is sparse), our
decomposition method outperforms those in [34] and [24] (see
Section V-B and V-C) in the sense that our recovery method
can tolerate a higher level of corruption (i.e., large support
size of D¯). This advance results from exploiting (7), which
reduces the degree of freedom of D¯.
Note that our method and analysis hold for an arbitrary W
and can be applied to other domains that involve decomposing
a matrix as in (8). As discussed in [24], applications include
unveiling network traffic anomalies [19], [32], dynamic mag-
netic resonance imaging [10], [11], face recognition [2], and
music analysis [20], [21].
III. ATTACK IDENTIFICATION WITHOUT NOISE
A. Identification method and guarantee
We first consider noiseless measurements (η = 0). We
assume a complete set of measurements for analysis, but our
method can be extended to cases when measurements are
partially lost. Moreover, although we consider attack patterns
in (7), our method can be generalized to detect combined
attacks. In this case, D¯ is generalized to
D¯ = C¯WT + S¯, (14)
where a sparse matrix S¯ represents attacks (observable and/or
unobservable) that have different locations across time. Then
(12)-(13) are generalized to
min
L∈Ct×p,C∈Ct×n,S∈Ct×p
‖L‖∗ + λ1‖C‖1,2 + λ2
∑
ij
|Sij | (15)
s.t.
∑
i,j∈Ω
|Mij − Lij − (CWT )ij − Sij |2 ≤ |Ω|
tp
η2, (16)
with given positive constants λ1, λ2. We study this extension
numerically in Section V-B.
To formally present the theoretical result, we need the
following definitions. Given L¯ = U¯ Σ¯V¯ † and W , we define
ǫ := ‖V¯ †W ‡‖∞,2, µ := max
i6=j
‖W †i Wj‖, (17)
and σk := max
I:|I|≤k
‖(W †IWI)−1‖. (18)
Note that σ1 = 1 as W has unit-norm columns, and ǫ depends
on the rank r of L¯, since ‖V¯ ‖2F = r.
Pick any constants ψ˜ and c in (0, 1) such that
(2− ψ˜)
√
ψ˜/(1− ψ˜) ≤
√
(1 + c)/(1− c). (19)
For any integer k, define
λmin,k =
(1 + (2 − ψ˜)−1)ǫ
1− (1 + (2− ψ˜)−1)kσkµ
(20)
and λmax,k =
√
ψ˜/(kσk). (21)
Our detection method is summarized in Method 1. (13) is
a convex program and can be solved efficiently by generic
solvers such as CVX[13]. Its recovery guarantee is as follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose there exists nonzero k˜ such that
k˜µ ≤ c, and λmin,k˜ ≤ λmax,k˜, (22)
with c, λmin,k˜, and λmax,k˜ defined in (19)-(21). Then as long
as the column support of C¯ has size at most k˜, for any λ ∈
[λmin,k˜, λmax,k˜], the output of Method 1 satisfies
U∗U∗† = U¯U¯ †, (23)
J ∗ = J¯ and L∗J ∗c = L¯J¯ c .
Theorem 1 guarantees that the affected PMUs can be
correctly located and thus, the “clean” PMU measurements
could be identified. Furthermore, the subspace spanned by the
actual phasors can be recovered. Since we do not obtain any
actual measurements from PMUs that are under attack, it is
impossible to recover the exact measurements in the affected
PMUs without further regularization. Under the conditions of
Theorem 1, the recovery is also successful when the column
support of C¯ is zero. Thus, the false alarm rate is zero.
Method 1 is motivated by [34]. In fact, after post-
multiplying W ‡(WTW ‡)−1 to both sides of (1), we have
MW ‡(WTW ‡)−1 = L¯W ‡(WTW ‡)−1+C¯+NW ‡(WTW ‡)−1
where the right-hand side is the sum of a low-rank matrix
plus a column-sparse matrix and noise. Then, the results
of [34] can be directly applied to our problem. We do not
follow this path due to two reasons. First, MW ‡(WTW ‡)−1
cannot be computed if some entries of M are missing, while
Method 1 can be easily extended to scenarios with missing
data by restricting the constraints in (13) to the observed
measurements. Second, (WTW ‡)−1 does not exist when W
is a flat matrix, i.e., p < n, while Method 1 and Theorem 1
can be applied to an arbitrary W .
B. Discussion of λ and k˜
We remark that due to the slackness in the proof, λ ∈
[λmin,k˜, λmax,k˜] in Theorem 1 is sufficient but not necessary5.
There may exist λ outside [λmin,k˜, λmax,k˜] that can still lead to
correct recovery. We observe from numerical experiments that
recovery performance is generally much better than the bound
in Theorem 1. Furthermore, when L is fixed, as k˜ decreases,
λmin,k˜ decreases, and λmax,k˜ increases. Thus, intuitively, if
the number of affected PMUs decreases, a wider range of λ
is proper for Method 1. For a detailed discussion, we state the
following lemma and defer its proof to the Appendix.
Lemma 1. Suppose kµ < 1, then σk ≤ (1− (k − 1)µ)−1.
Since σk increases in k, σ1 ≥ 1, and kµ ≤ c < 1, together
with Lemma 1, we know σk˜ = Θ(1)6. Since ψ˜ is a constant,
one can check that λmin,k˜ = Θ(ǫ), and λmax,k˜ = Θ(
√
1/k˜).
Note that ‖V¯ †‖2F = r. We assume that ‖V¯ †‖ is column-
incoherent [34] with some positive constant ρ > 1, i.e.,
‖V¯ †‖∞,2 ≤
√
ρr/p. (24)
We assume the number of PMU channels incident to each bus
is in the range of [d, Cd] for some d > 0 and some constant
C. This is also the number of nonzero entries in each column
of W with unit column-norm. Then p = Θ(dn), and we have
ǫ = ‖V¯ †W ‡‖∞,2 ≤
√
ρr
p
max
i
∑
j
|Wij | = O(
√
r
n
). (25)
Therefore, as long as k˜ = O(n/r), when n is sufficiently large,
λmin,k˜ ≤ λmax,k˜. k˜µ ≤ c requires that k˜ = O(1/µ). Note that
µ = Θ( 1
d
). Thus, if both k˜ = O(n/r) and k˜ = O(d) hold,
then a proper λ exists, and Theorem 1 holds.
In the case that d = Θ(n), k˜ could be Θ(n/r). If r is a
constant, our method succeeds even when a constant fraction
of bus voltages are corrupted. Also consider the case that k˜ =
1. We pick ψ˜ and c in (19) arbitrarily close to one, then λ = 1
is a proper choice (see Fig. 16 for results on actual PMU data)
provided that ǫ + µ ≤ 0.5. Since ǫ scales as 1/√n and µ
scales as 1/d, the condition will be met in large systems that
are tightly connected. Intuitively, µ is small if the bus degree
is high, and the line impedances are in the same range.
We next use an example to illustrate the existence of proper
λ. Consider an n-bus (n is even) ring network in Fig. 6. Each
odd-numbered bus is connected to all even-numbered buses.
There is no connection among odd buses and no connection
among even-numbered buses. A PMU is installed on each odd
bus and measures the corresponding voltage phasor and all
incident line current phasors. For the simplicity of analysis,
we assume Zij = 1 and Y ij = 0 in this ring network. W is
a (n
2
4 +
n
2 )× n matrix with unit norm columns. Specifically,
for every integer k,
5Specially, the requirements on dual certificate in Lemma 4 are sufficient
but not necessary. Furthermore, we use loose bounds in the proofs to simplify
analysis. ǫ, µ, and σk are in turn defined based on worst-case scenarios.
6We use the notations g(n) ∈ O(h(n)), g(n) ∈ Ω(h(n)), or g(n) =
Θ(h(n)) if as n goes to infinity, g(n) ≤ c · h(n), g(n) ≥ c · h(n) or
c1 · h(n) ≤ g(n) ≤ c2 · h(n) eventually holds for some positive constants
c, c1 and c2 respectively.
Fig. 6: n-bus ring network
Wij =


√
2/(n+ 2), if i ∈ Ik1 and j = 2k − 1
−√2/n, if i ∈ Ik2 and j = 2k
0, otherwise
,
where
Ik1 :=
{
k + (k − 1)n
2
+ k′ | interger k′ = 0, 1, 2, ..., n
2
}
,
Ik2 :=
{
k + 1 + (
n
2
+ 1)k′ | interger k′ = 0, 1, 2, ..., n
2
− 1
}
.
Note that |Ik1| = n2 + 1, |Ik2| = n2 for all k. Here, µ =
2/
√
n2 + 2n. Then we have
(V †W ‡)j =
{√
2/(n+ 2)
∑
i∈Ik1
(V †)i, if j = 2k − 1
−√2/n∑i∈Ik2(V †)i, if j = 2k ,(26)
where V ∈ C(n24 +n2 )×r contains the right singular vectors of
the rank-r measurement matrix L¯ ∈ Ct×(n24 +n2 ). If ‖V¯ †‖ is
column-incoherent [34] with some positive constant ρ, then
ǫ = ‖V¯ †W ‡‖∞,2 ≤max
(√ 2
n+ 2
|Ik1|,
√
2
n
|Ik2|
) · ‖V¯ †‖∞,2
≤
√
n+ 2
2
·
√
ρr
(n2 + 1)
n
2
≤
√
2ρr
n
, (27)
where the first inequality follows from (26), and the second
inequality follows from (24).
To find λ, we pick c = 1/4 and ψ˜ = 1/8. We choose
k˜ = n48ρr . One can check that (19) follows. Then
k˜µ =
n
48ρr
× 2√
n2 + 2n
≤ 1
24ρr
≤ 1
24
≤ 1
4
= c, (28)
where the last inequality follows since ρ > 1 and r ≥ 1. Then
from Lemma 1, we have
σk˜ ≤ (1− (k˜ − 1)µ)−1 ≤ (1− k˜µ)−1 ≤ 24/23. (29)
From (20) and (21),
λmin,k˜ ≤
(1 + (2− ψ˜)−1)ǫ
1− (1 + (2− ψ˜)−1)k˜µσk˜
≤ 23ǫ
14
≤ 23
14
√
2ρr
n
.
(30)
λmax,k˜ =
√
1/8
n
48ρrσk˜
≥ 1
2
√
23ρr
n
. (31)
Since 2314
√
2ρr
n
< 12
√
23ρr
n
, then λmin,k˜ < λmax,k˜. Then
there exists λ such that Method 1 correctly identifies the
corruptions in up to k˜ = n48ρr bus voltages. In fact, any
λ ∈ [ 2314
√
2ρr
n
, 12
√
23ρr
n
] suffices. Note that for a constant r, k˜
is linear in n, the total number of buses.
C. Proof sketch of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 follows the same line as the proof
of Theorem 1 in [34]. With the additional projection matrix
W , our proof is more involved than the one in [34].
Like [34], we design the following Oracle Problem (32) by
adding explicit constraints that the solution pair should have
the correct column space of L¯ and the correct column support
of C¯ . The major step is to show that an optimal solution
(L∗,C∗) to (13) is also an solution to the Oracle problem (32).
Note that Oracle problem is only designed for analysis, since
U¯ and I¯ are unknown to the operator.
Oracle Problem min
L,C
‖L‖∗ + λ‖C‖1,2
s.t. M = L+ CWT
PU¯ (L) = L, PI¯(C) = C.
(32)
Let (L′, C′) be an optimal solution to the Oracle problem
(32). We define PT ′ := PU ′+PV ′−PU ′PV ′ , where the SVD
of L′ = U ′Σ′V ′†. Define
G(C′) := {H ∈ Ct×k | ∀i ∈ I ′ : Hi = C′i/‖C′i‖;
∀i ∈ I¯ ∩ (I ′)c : ‖Hi‖2 ≤ 1},
where I ′ is the column support of C′. We have
Lemma 2 (Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 of [34]).
U ′U ′† = U¯ U¯ †.
There exists an orthonormal matrix Vˆ ∈ Ct×p such that
U ′V ′† = U¯ Vˆ †. (33)
Also, we have
PT ′ := PU ′ + PV ′ − PU ′PV ′ = PU¯ + PVˆ − PU¯PVˆ .
The following lemma establishes that the solution to the
Oracle problem (32) is also a solution to (13),
Lemma 3. An optimal solution (L′, C′) to (32) is an optimal
solution to (13) if there exists Q ∈ Ct×p that satisfies
(a)PT ′(Q) = U ′V ′†, (b)‖PT ′⊥(Q)‖ ≤ 1,
(c)(QW ‡)I¯/λ ∈ G(C′), and (d)‖(QW ‡)I¯c‖∞,2 ≤ λ.(34)
If both (b) and (d) are strict, and PJ¯ ∩ PV ′ = {0}, then
any optimal solution (L∗, C∗) to (13) satisfies PU¯ (L∗) = L∗,
PI¯(C∗) = C∗.
The major technical step is to construct Q, called the dual
certificate, that satisfies (34). Our construction method is as
follows. Pick Hˆ ∈ G(C′) that satisfies
Vˆ †W ‡
I¯
= λU¯ †Hˆ. (35)
Define
Φ := λHˆ(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ , ∆1 := PU¯ (Φ), (36)
∆2 := PU¯⊥(I − PWI¯ )PVˆ (I +
∞∑
i=1
(P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ )i)PVˆ (Φ),
(37)
where PWI¯ (X) := XW ‡I¯(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ . (38)
Q := U¯ Vˆ † +Φ−∆1 −∆2. (39)
We show that Q in (39) is well defined in Appendix-B. Lemma
4 shows that Q in (39) is the desired dual certificate.
Lemma 4. Suppose there exists nonzero k˜ such that k˜µ ≤ c
for c in (19), and λmin,k˜ ≤ λmax,k˜ with λmin,k˜ and λmax,k˜
defined in (20) and (21). Then as long as the column support of
C¯ has size at most k˜, for any λ ∈ [λmin,k˜, λmax,k˜], Q defined
in (39) satisfies (34).
Theorem 1 follows when we combine Lemmas 3 and 4.
Please refer to the Appendix for the proofs.
IV. ATTACK IDENTIFICATION WITH NOISE
We now analyze the detection performance when M con-
tains noise (N 6= 0) with ‖N‖F ≤ η. Given k, define
λ′min,k =
(1 + (2− ψ˜)−1)ǫ
1/2− (1 + (2− ψ˜)−1)kσµ , and λ
′
max,k =
1
2
√
ψ˜
kσk
.
Theorem 2. Suppose there exists nonzero k˜ such that k˜µ ≤ c
for c in (19), and λ′
min,k˜
≤ λ′
max,k˜
. Then if column support
size of C¯ is at most k˜, for any λ ∈ [λ′
min,k˜
, λ′
max,k˜
], there exists
a pair (L˜, C˜), where L˜ + C˜WT = L¯ + C¯WT , PU¯ (L˜) = L˜
and PI¯(C˜) = C˜, such that the output of Method 1 satisfies
‖L∗ − L˜‖F
≤(2− ψ˜ + λ+ (2− ψ˜)
√
1 + (n− 1)µ
λ
√
θ + 3r)
2η
1− ψ˜ ,
(40)
and ‖C∗ − C˜‖F
≤(1 + (λ+
√
1 + (n− 1)µ
λ
+
1− ψ˜
λσk
√
1 + (k − 1)µ )
√
θ + 3r)
2ησk
√
1 + (k − 1)µ
1− ψ˜ , (41)
where θ := min(t, p).
The discussion of the existence of λ is very similar to the
discussion for Theorem 1, so we skip it. If k˜µ ≤ c and k˜ =
O(n/r) hold, then a proper λ exists. Theorem 2 guarantees
that (L∗, C∗) returned by Method 1 is “close” to a pair that
has the correct column space and column support, and the
distance measured by Frobenius norm is proportional to the
noise level η. The proof of Theorem 2 follows the same line
as the proof of Theorem 2 in [34] mostly with modifications
to address the projection matrix W . We establish Lemma 5, a
counterpart in the noisy case of Lemma 3, that demonstrates
that Method 1 succeeds if there exists a dual certificate Q with
tighter requirements than that in the noiseless case.
Lemma 5. There exists (L˜, C˜) where L˜+C˜WT = L¯+C¯WT ,
PU¯ (L˜) = L˜, PI¯(C˜) = C˜ , such that the output of Method 1
satisfies (40) and (41), if there exists Q ∈ Ct×p that satisfies
(a)PT¯ (Q) = U¯ V¯ †, (b)‖PT¯⊥(Q)‖ ≤ 1/2,
(c)(QW ‡)I¯/λ ∈ G(C¯), and (d)‖(QW ‡)I¯c‖∞,2 ≤ λ/2.(42)
The construction of Q is the same as that in Section III
(equations (35) to (39)). We show that Q is the desire dual
certificate if λ belongs to [λ′min, λ′max] in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. If the column support size of C¯ is at most k˜, then
for any λ ∈ [λ′min, λ′max], Q defined in (39) satisfies (42).
Theorem 2 follows when we combine Lemmas 5 and 6.
Please refer to the Appendix for the proofs.
V. SIMULATION
We explore the performance of data attack identification
methods on both synthetic data and actual PMU data from
the Central NY power system. We use CVX [13] to solve
(13). We identify a column of C∗ to be nonzero if its ℓ2
norm exceeds the predefined threshold ǫ1. Method 1 succeeds
if ‖U∗U∗† − U¯U¯ †‖ ≤ ǫ2 for some small positive ǫ2, and the
column supports of C¯ and C∗ are the same.
A. Performance on synthetic data
Fix t = p = 50. Given rank r, we generate matrices A ∈
Rt×r and B ∈ Rp×r with each entry independently drawn
from Gaussian N (0, 1) and set L¯ := ABT . We generate
matrix W ∈ Rp×n with independent N (0, 1) entries. To
generate a column-sparse matrix C¯ ∈ Rt×n, we randomly
select the column support and set the nonzero entries to be
independent N (0, 1). We vary r and the number of corrupted
columns, and take 100 runs for each case. λ is set to be 0.95.
1) Noiseless formulation: We simulate the observed mea-
surement matrix M according to (8) with N = 0. We apply
Method 1 to obtain the estimation (L∗, C∗). We set ǫ1 and ǫ2
to be 0.002 and 0.01, respectively. Fig. 7 shows the transition
property of Method 1 in gray scale. White stands for 100%
success while black denotes 100% failure. When n is 25, W
is a tall matrix (p > n). When n is 100, W is a flat matrix
(p < n). For both simulations, the identification is successful
even when rank r is six, and C¯ has two nonzero columns.
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Fig. 7: Matrix decomposition performance for different n
We further assume some of the observations are missing.
We generate M as before and then delete some randomly
selected entries. Fig. 8 shows the decomposition performance
of Method 1 for partial observation. We can see that the suc-
cessful decomposition rate is close to the complete observation
case even only 80% of the entries are observed.
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Fig. 8: Matrix decomposition performance for different n with
80% observed entries
2) Noisy formulation: We generate matrix N ∈ Rt×p with
independent Gaussian N (0, σ2) entries. We fix the matrix rank
r to be 3 and the number of corrupted columns to be 3. We
simulate the observed measurement matrix M according to
(8). We set η to be ‖N‖F and apply Method 1 to obtain the
estimation (L∗, C∗). ǫ1 is set to be 0.001.
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Fig. 9: Performance of Method 1 for different noise level σ
Fig. 9 shows the difference between the original and re-
constructed column space (‖U∗U∗†− U¯U¯ †‖) and the succeed
rate for determining the set of corrupted columns according
to different noise level σ. We can see that Method 1 can
successfully identify the corrupted columns when the noise
level σ is below 0.25. Method 1 can recover the column space
with small errors when σ is smaller than 0.1.
B. Comparison with other methods on synthetic data
1) D¯ = C¯W T is column-sparse: Refs. [34] [22] considered
matrix decomposition problem when D¯ is column-sparse and
scattered-sparse, respectively. We compare our method with
them in the special case that D¯ = C¯WT is column-sparse. Fix
t = p = 50, n = 20, and r = 2. We generate L¯ and C¯ with
the same rules as in Section V-A. We generate a binary matrix
W ∈ Rp×n with two ‘1’s each row and five ‘1’s each column.
Then the ratio of support sizes of D¯ and C¯ is about five. D¯
is column-sparse when C¯ is column-sparse. We simulate the
measurement matrix M according to (8) with N = 0. λ in
our method is set to be 0.9. λ’s in methods of [34] and [22]
are set to be 0.5 and 0.1, respectively.
Fig. 10 shows the success rates of three methods with
different support sizes of C¯. Our method performs the best
since we exploit the structure D¯ = C¯WT besides sparsity.
The false alarm rate of our method is zero.
2) Combination of attack patterns.: We consider the gen-
eral case that the attacks satisfy (14). We use the generalized
version in (15)-(16) to detect combined attacks. λ1 and λ2 in
(15) are set to be 1 and 0.1, respectively. λ’s in methods of
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Fig. 10: Success rates when D¯ = C¯WT is column-sparse.
[34] and [22] are set to be 0.5 and 0.1, respectively. L¯, C¯,
and W are generated the same as above. S¯ is a sparse matrix
with nonzero entries independently drawn from N (0, 1). We
define the correct estimation of the column space of L¯ as a
successful recovery. Fig. 11 compares the methods when C¯ is
a zero matrix. The attacks are scattered-sparse, and our method
performs as well as that in [22]. Fig. 12 compares the methods
when both column-sparse and scattered-sparse attacks exist.
Besides a sparse S¯, we randomly select two columns in C¯
and select their entries independently from N (0, 1). Only our
method succeeds when both attacks exist.
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Fig. 11: Success rates when D¯ = S¯ is scattered-sparse.
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Fig. 12: Success rates when D¯ = C¯WT + S¯.
C. Performance comparison on actual PMU data
We consider the PMU data shown in Section II-A. Two two-
second PMU datasets are tested. One contains ambient data,
and the other contains an abnormal event (t = 17 − 19s and
t = 2− 4s in Fig. 2, respectively). We first inject data attacks
as an intruder and then use Method 1 to detect the attacks.
We consider the scenario that an intruder alters the PMU
channels that measure I12,I52,I13 and I43 in order to corrupt
voltage estimations of Buses 2 and 3. Fig. 13 visualizes the
actual PMU data and the data after the injection of attacks
for two 2-second datasets. η and λ are set to be 5 and 1
respectively in Method 1. Fig. 14 shows the ℓ2 norm of each
column of the resulting D¯ matrix. The columns with signifi-
cant ℓ2 norm correspond to channels that measure I12,I52,I13
and I43. Therefore, our method successfully identifies the four
PMU channels under attack. We repeat the same experiment
when an intruder alters the channels that measure V 5, I52,
I54, I59, and I45 to corrupt voltage estimation of Buses 5.
Fig. 15 shows the ℓ2 norm of each column of the resulting
C¯ matrix in this case. The column with significant ℓ2 norm
corresponds Bus 5. Thus the recovery is also successful.
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Fig. 13: The actual PMU data and PMU data under attack
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Fig. 15: ℓ2 norm of each column of C¯
Fig. 16 compares our method and that in [34] on the ambient
PMU data. Given support size of C¯, the result is averaged
over all possible attack locations. Our method outperforms
[34] because we exploit (7) to reduce the degree of freedom
in D¯. For example, 7 out of 23 channels needs to be attacked
to change the state of Bus 1. That means 30% of the columns
of D¯ are nonzero. This high percentage of corruption in D¯
cannot be handedly by [34].
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Fig. 16: Success rates with varying support size of C¯ , or
equivalently, the number of affected system states.
VI. CONCLUSION
We address the problem of detecting successive unobserv-
able cyber data attacks to PMU measurements. We formulate
the identification problem as a matrix decomposition problem
of a low-rank matrix and a transformed column-sparse matrix.
We propose a convex-optimization-based method and provide
its theoretical guarantee. Although motivated by power sys-
tem monitoring, our results on matrix decomposition can be
applied to other scenarios. One future direction is the analysis
of the detection performance when some of the measurements
are lost during the communication to the central operator.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We thank New York Power Authority for providing PMU
data for the Central NY Power System. This research is
supported in part by the ERC Program of NSF and DoE
under the supplement to NSF Award EEC-1041877 and the
CURENT Industry Partnership Program, and in part by NSF
Grant 1508875, NYSERDA Grants #36653 and #28815.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Abur and A. G. Exposito, Power system state estimation: theory and
implementation. CRC Press, 2004.
[2] R. Basri and D. W. Jacobs, “Lambertian reflectance and linear sub-
spaces,” IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell., vol. 25, no. 2, pp.
218–233, 2003.
[3] R. B. Bobba, K. M. Rogers, Q. Wang, H. Khurana, K. Nahrstedt,
and T. J. Overbye, “Detecting false data injection attacks on DC state
estimation,” in Proc. the First Workshop on Secure Control Systems
(SCS), 2010.
[4] E. J. Candès, X. Li, Y. Ma, and J. Wright, “Robust principal component
analysis?” Journal of the ACM (JACM), vol. 58, no. 3, p. 11, 2011.
[5] V. Chandrasekaran, S. Sanghavi, P. A. Parrilo, and A. S. Willsky,
“Rank-sparsity incoherence for matrix decomposition,” SIAM Journal
on Optimization, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 572–596, 2011.
[6] J. Chen and A. Abur, “Placement of PMUs to enable bad data detection
in state estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 1608–
1615, 2006.
[7] Y. Chen, L. Xie, and P. Kumar, “Dimensionality reduction and early
event detection using online synchrophasor data,” in Proc. IEEE Power
and Energy Society General Meeting, 2013, pp. 1–5.
[8] N. Dahal, R. L. King, and V. Madani, “Online dimension reduction of
synchrophasor data,” in Proc. IEEE PES Transmission and Distribution
Conference and Exposition (T&D), 2012, pp. 1–7.
[9] G. Dán and H. Sandberg, “Stealth attacks and protection schemes
for state estimators in power systems,” in Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2010,
pp. 214–219.
[10] J. P. Finn, K. Nael, V. Deshpande, O. Ratib, and G. Laub, “Cardiac
MR imaging: State of the technology1,” Radiology, vol. 241, no. 2, pp.
338–354, 2006.
[11] H. Gao, J.-F. Cai, Z. Shen, and H. Zhao, “Robust principal compo-
nent analysis-based four-dimensional computed tomography,” Physics
in medicine and biology, vol. 56, no. 11, p. 3181, 2011.
[12] P. Gao, M. Wang, S. Ghiocel, and J. H. Chow, “Modeless reconstruction
of missing synchrophasor measurements,” in Proc. IEEE PES General
Meeting (selected in Best Papers Sessions), 2014.
[13] M. Grant and S. Boyd, “CVX: Matlab software for disciplined convex
programming, version 1.21,” http://cvxr.com/, Oct. 2010.
[14] E. Handschin, F. Schweppe, J. Kohlas, and A. Fiechter, “Bad data
analysis for power system state estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power App.
Syst., vol. 94, no. 2, pp. 329–337, 1975.
[15] C. Herridge, M. Levine, M. Emanuel, and M. Oinounou,
“Sources: Staged cyber attack reveals vulnerability in
power grid,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/04/08/
cyberspies-penetrate-power-grid-leave-software-disrupt/, 2009.
[16] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, Matrix analysis. Cambridge university
press, 2012.
[17] T. Kim and H. Poor, “Strategic protection against data injection attacks
on power grids,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 326–333,
2011.
[18] O. Kosut, L. Jia, R. Thomas, and L. Tong, “Malicious data attacks on
smart grid state estimation: Attack strategies and countermeasures,” in
Proc. IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications
(SmartGridComm), 2010, pp. 220–225.
[19] A. Lakhina, M. Crovella, and C. Diot, “Diagnosing network-wide traffic
anomalies,” in ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review,
vol. 34, no. 4, 2004, pp. 219–230.
[20] Y. Li and D. Wang, “Separation of singing voice from music accompa-
niment for monaural recordings,” IEEE Trans. Audio, Speech, Language
Process., vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 1475–1487, 2007.
[21] Z. Lin, A. Ganesh, J. Wright, L. Wu, M. Chen, and Y. Ma, “Fast convex
optimization algorithms for exact recovery of a corrupted low-rank
matrix,” Computational Advances in Multi-Sensor Adaptive Processing
(CAMSAP), vol. 61, 2009.
[22] L. Liu, M. Esmalifalak, Q. Ding, V. A. Emesih, and Z. Han, “Detecting
false data injection attacks on power grid by sparse optimization,” IEEE
Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 612–621, 2014.
[23] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against
state estimation in electric power grids,” ACM Transactions on Informa-
tion and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 14, no. 1, p. 13, 2011.
[24] M. Mardani, G. Mateos, and G. Giannakis, “Recovery of low-rank
plus compressed sparse matrices with application to unveiling traffic
anomalies,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 59, no. 8, pp. 5186–5205,
2013.
[25] H. M. Merrill and F. C. Schweppe, “Bad data suppression in power
system static state estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power App. Syst., no. 6, pp.
2718–2725, 1971.
[26] J. Meserve, “Sources: Staged cyber attack reveals vulnerability in power
grid,” http:// www.cnn.com/ 2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/ , 2007.
[27] A. Monticelli and A. Garcia, “Reliable bad data processing for real-time
state estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power App. Syst., no. 5, pp. 1126–1139,
1983.
[28] B. Recht, M. Fazel, and P. A. Parrilo, “Guaranteed minimum-rank
solutions of linear matrix equations via nuclear norm minimization,”
SIAM Rev., vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 471–501, 2010.
[29] H. Sandberg, A. Teixeira, and K. H. Johansson, “On security indices
for state estimators in power networks,” in Proc. the First Workshop on
Secure Control Systems (SCS), 2010.
[30] H. Sedghi and E. Jonckheere, “Statistical structure learning of smart grid
for detection of false data injection,” in Proc. IEEE Power and Energy
Society General Meeting (PES), 2013, pp. 1–5.
[31] A. Tajer, S. Kar, H. V. Poor, and S. Cui, “Distributed joint cyber attack
detection and state recovery in smart grids,” in Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2011,
pp. 202–207.
[32] M. Thottan and C. Ji, “Anomaly detection in IP networks,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 51, no. 8, pp. 2191–2204, 2003.
[33] M. Wang, P. Gao, S. Ghiocel, J. H. Chow, B. Fardanesh, G. Stefopoulos,
and M. P. Razanousky, “Identification of "unobservable" cyber data
attacks on power grids,” in Proc. IEEE SmartGridComm, 2014.
[34] H. Xu, C. Caramanis, and S. Sanghavi, “Robust pca via outlier pursuit,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 3047–3064, May 2012.
[35] W. Xu, M. Wang, L. Lai, and A. Tang, “Sparse error correction from
nonlinear measurements with applications in bad data detection for
power networks,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 61, no. 24, pp.
6175–6187, 2013.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: We first state the following result that will be used
in the proof.
Lemma 7 (Geršhgorin circle theorem [16]). Let A be a
complex n×n matrix, with entries aij . Then, every eigenvalue
of A lies within at least one of the Geršhgorin discs Di(A)(i =
1, ..., n), where Di(A) := {z ∈ C : |z − aii| ≤
∑
j 6=i |aij |}.
For any given I with |I| ≤ k, since W has unit-norm
columns, and |W †i Wj | ≤ µ for all i 6= j, from Geršhgorin
circle theorem, we have ‖I−W †IWI‖ ≤ (k−1)µ < 1, where
the last inequality follows from kµ < 1. Then,
‖(W †IWI)−1‖ =‖
∞∑
i=0
(I −W †IWI)i‖ ≤
∞∑
i=0
‖(I −W †IWI)i‖
≤1/(1− (k − 1)µ).
The lemma follows from the definition of σk.
B. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: For any ∆ ∈ Ct×n, 〈L′+∆WT , C′−∆〉 is feasi-
ble to (13). Let G be such that ‖G‖ = 1, 〈G,PT ′⊥(∆WT )〉 =
‖PT ′⊥(∆WT )‖∗ and PT ′(G) = 0. Then PT ′(Q) + G is a
subgradient of ‖L′‖∗. Let F be such that Fi = −∆i/‖∆i‖2
if i ∈ I¯c and ∆i 6= 0, and Fi = 0 otherwise. Then
PI¯(QW ‡)/λ+ F is a subgradient of ‖C′‖1,2. Then
‖L′ +∆WT ‖∗ + λ‖C′ −∆‖1,2 − ‖L′‖∗ − λ‖C′‖1,2
≥〈PT ′(Q) +G,∆WT 〉 − λ〈PI¯(QW ‡)/λ+ F,∆〉
=‖PT ′⊥(∆WT )‖∗ + λ‖PI¯c(∆)‖1,2 + 〈Q− PT ′⊥(Q),∆WT 〉
− 〈QW ‡ − PI¯c(QW ‡),∆〉
≥(1 − ‖PT ′⊥(Q)‖)‖PT ′⊥(∆WT )‖∗
+ (λ− ‖(QW ‡)I¯c‖∞,2)‖PI¯c(∆)‖1,2
≥0
(43)
From (43), 〈L′, C′〉 is an optimal solution to (13). If (34) holds
with strict inequality, the last inequality of (43) is strict unless
‖PT ′⊥(∆WT )‖∗ = ‖PI¯c(∆)‖1,2 = 0. (44)
(44) implies that ∆WT ∈ PT ′ and ∆ ∈ PI¯ . Note that ∆ ∈ PI¯
implies that ∆WT ∈ PJ¯ . Then
PJ¯ (∆WT ) = ∆WT = PT ′(∆WT )
= PU ′(∆WT ) + PV ′PU ′⊥(∆WT )
= PJ¯PU ′(∆WT ) + PV ′PU ′⊥(∆WT ), (45)
where the last equality holds since PJ¯ (∆WT ) =
∆WT . Thus, from (45) we have PJ¯PU ′⊥(∆WT ) =
PV ′PU ′⊥(∆WT ), which means PU ′⊥(∆WT ) ∈ PJ¯ ∩
PV ′ . Then PU ′⊥(∆WT ) is 0 from the assumption. Then,
PU¯ (∆WT ) = PU ′(∆WT ) = ∆WT , where the first equality
holds from (33). Therefore, for any optimal solution 〈L′ +
∆WT , C′ − ∆〉 for some ∆ 6= 0 to (13), ∆WT ∈ PU¯ , and
∆ ∈ PI¯ . The claim follows.
C. Construction of Q
Here we demonstrate that Q in (39) is well defined. The key
is to show (a) there exists Hˆ ∈ G(C′) such that (35) holds,
and (b) the infinite sum in (37) converges. We prove these two
properties through the following lemmas.
Lemma 8. There exists Hˆ ∈ G(C′) such that (35) holds.
Proof: Since 〈L′, C′〉 is an optimal solution to the Oracle
problem (32), there exists G′, A′ ∈ Ct×p, B′, Z ∈ Ct×n, and
some Hˆ ∈ G(C) such that
(U¯ Vˆ † +G′ + PU¯⊥(A′))W ‡ = λ(Hˆ + Z) + PIc(B′), (46)
where PT ′⊥(G′) = 0 and PI(Z) = 0. Then
PU¯PI¯(((U¯ Vˆ † +G′ + PU¯⊥(A′))W ‡) = U¯ Vˆ †W ‡I¯ , (47)
PU¯PI¯(λ(Hˆ+Z)+PIc(B′)) = λPU¯PI¯(Hˆ) = λU¯U¯ †Hˆ (48)
Combining (46)-(48), we have
U¯ Vˆ †W ‡
I¯
= λU¯ U¯ †Hˆ. (49)
By multiplying U¯ † to both sides of (49), we obtain Lemma 8.
Lemma 9.
ψ := ‖P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ ‖ ≤ ψ˜ < 1
Proof:
‖P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ (X)‖
=‖XVˆ Vˆ †W ‡
I¯
(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ Vˆ Vˆ
†‖
(a)
=‖XVˆ (λU¯ †Hˆ)(WTI¯ W ‡I¯)−1(λU¯ †Hˆ)†Vˆ †‖
≤‖X‖‖Vˆ U¯ †‖‖λHˆ‖‖(W †
I¯
WI¯)
−1‖‖λHˆ†‖‖U¯ Vˆ †‖
(b)
≤‖X‖ · 1 · λ
√
k · σk · λ
√
k · 1
(c)
≤‖X‖λmaxk˜σk˜
(d)
= ‖X‖ψ˜,
where (a) follows from Lemma 8, (b) follows from the fact that
Hˆ has at most k nonzero columns with unit-norm, (c) follows
from the property that λ ≤ λmax, k ≤ k˜ and σk ≤ σk˜ , and
(d) follows from the definition of ψ˜. Then Lemma 9 follows.
Lemma 10. P
Vˆ
(I−PWI¯ )PVˆ is an injection from PVˆ to PVˆ ,
and its inverse operation is (I +
∑∞
i=1(PVˆ PWI¯PVˆ )i).
Proof: Since ‖P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ ‖ < 1 from Lemma 9, then
(I +
∑∞
i=1(PVˆ PWI¯PVˆ )i) is well defined. For any X ∈ PVˆ ,
we have
P
Vˆ
(I − PWI¯ )PVˆ (I +
∞∑
i=1
(P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ )i)(X)
=P
Vˆ
(I − P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ )(I +
∞∑
i=1
(P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ )i)(X)
=P
Vˆ
(X) = X. (50)
Then the lemma follows.
D. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: We need to show that Q defined in (39) satisfies
all the conditions in (34). We first summarize some properties
that will be used in the proof. Since W has unit-norm columns,
|W †i Wj | ≤ µ for all i 6= j, and |I¯| ≤ k, we have
‖WI¯‖ =
√
λmax(W
†
I¯
WI¯) ≤
√
1 + (k − 1)µ, (51)
where the inequality follows from the Geršhgorin circle theo-
rem. From |I¯| ≤ k and |W †i Wj | ≤ µ for all i 6= j, we have
‖(W †
I¯
WI¯c)‖∞,2 ≤
√
kµ. Since Hˆ has at most k unit-norm
columns while other columns are zero, we have
‖λHˆ‖ ≤ λ
√
k. (52)
Step 1: verification of (a) of (34).
PU ′(Q) (a)= PU¯ (Q) = U¯ Vˆ † + PU¯ (Φ)− PU¯ (Φ)− 0 = U¯ Vˆ †,
(53)
where (a) follows from (23). From (33), we have
Vˆ Vˆ † = V ′U ′†U¯ U¯ †U ′V ′†
(b)
= V ′U ′†U ′U ′†U ′V ′† = V ′V ′†,
where (b) follows from (33). Thus, PV ′(·) = PVˆ (·). Then
PV ′(Q) = PVˆ (Q)
(c)
= U¯ Vˆ † + P
Vˆ
(Φ)− P
Vˆ
PU¯ (Φ)
− P
Vˆ
(I − PWI¯ )PVˆ (I +
∞∑
i=1
(P
Vˆ
PWI¯
P
Vˆ
)i)P
Vˆ
PU¯⊥(Φ)
(d)
= U¯ Vˆ † + P
Vˆ
(Φ)− P
Vˆ
PU¯ (Φ)− PVˆ PU¯⊥(Φ)
= U¯ Vˆ †. (54)
(c) follows since PWI¯ , PVˆ , and PVˆ PWI¯PVˆ are all given by
right matrix multiplication, while PU¯⊥ is given by left matrix
multiplication. (d) follows from Lemma 10. Combining (53)
and (54), we obtain that (a) of (34) holds.
Step 2: verification of (b) of (34).
‖PT ′⊥(Q)‖ = ‖PVˆ ⊥PU¯⊥(Φ)−
PU¯⊥PVˆ ⊥(I − PWI¯ )PVˆ (I +
∞∑
i=1
(P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ )i)PVˆ (Φ)‖
≤‖Φ‖+ (1 +
∞∑
i=1
ψi)‖Φ‖ = 2− ψ
1− ψ ‖Φ‖
(e)
≤ 2− ψ
1− ψ ‖λHˆ‖‖(W
†
I¯
WI¯)
−1‖‖WTI¯ ‖
(f)
≤ 2− ψ
1− ψλ
√
kσk
√
1 + (k − 1)µ (55)
(g)
≤ 2− ψ˜
1− ψ˜
√
ψ˜
k˜σk˜
√
k˜σk˜
√
1 + (k˜ − 1)µ (56)
(h)
≤ 2− ψ˜
1− ψ˜
√
ψ˜
√
1 + (k˜ − 1)µ
1− (k˜ − 1)µ (57)
(i)
≤ 2− ψ˜
1− ψ˜
√
ψ˜
√
1 + c
1− c
(j)
≤ 1.
where (e) follows from the definition of Φ, and (f) follows
from (51) and (52). (g) follows from the property that ψ ≤ ψ˜,
1 ≤ k ≤ k˜, λ ≤ λmax,k˜, and σk ≤ σk˜. (h) follows from
Lemma 1. (i) follow from k˜µ ≤ c, and (j) follows from (19).
Then (b) of (34) holds.
Step 3: verification of (c) of (34). First consider
(∆2W
‡)I¯
=(PU¯⊥(I − PWI¯ )PVˆ (I +
∞∑
i=1
(P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ )i)PVˆ (Φ)W ‡)I¯
(k)
=(PU¯⊥PVˆ (I +
∞∑
i=1
(P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ )i)PVˆ (Φ))(I−
W ‡
I¯
(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ )W
‡
I¯
= 0
where (k) holds since PWI¯ , PVˆ , and PVˆ PWI¯PVˆ are all given
by right matrix multiplication, while PU¯⊥ is given by left
matrix multiplication. Then
(QW ‡)I¯ = (U¯ Vˆ W
‡ +ΦW ‡ − PU¯ (Φ)W ‡)I¯ − (∆2W ‡)I¯
= U¯ Vˆ W ‡
I¯
+ΦW ‡
I¯
− PU¯ (Φ)W ‡I¯ − 0
(l)
= λU¯U¯ †Hˆ + λHˆ − λU¯U¯ †Hˆ
= λHˆ ∈ λG(C′), (58)
where (l) follows from Lemma 8 and the definition of Φ in
(36). Then (c) of (34) holds.
Step 4: verification of (d) of (34). First consider
‖(∆2W ‡)I¯c‖∞,2
=‖PU¯⊥PVˆ (I +
∞∑
i=1
(P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ )i)
· ΦVˆ Vˆ †(I −W ‡
I¯
(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ )W
‡
I¯c
‖∞,2
=‖PU¯⊥PVˆ (I +
∞∑
i=1
(P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ )i)Φ(Vˆ Vˆ †W ‡I¯c−
Vˆ Vˆ †W ‡
I¯
(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ )W
‡
I¯c
‖∞,2
≤‖I +
∞∑
i=1
(P
Vˆ
PWI¯PVˆ )i‖‖Φ‖
(
‖Vˆ ‖‖Vˆ W ‡
I¯c
‖∞,2
+ ‖Vˆ ‖Vˆ †W ‡
I¯
‖‖(W †
I¯
WI¯)
−1‖‖WTI¯ W ‡I¯c‖∞,2
)
≤‖Φ‖(ǫ+ λ
√
kσk
√
kµ)
1− ψ ≤
ǫ+ λkσkµ
2− ψ ≤
ǫ+ λkσkµ
2− ψ˜ ,
where the second to last inequality follows from (e) to (j) in
step 2.
‖(QW ‡)I¯c‖∞,2
=‖(U¯ Vˆ W ‡ +ΦW ‡ − PU¯ (Φ)W ‡ −∆2W ‡)I¯c‖∞,2
=‖U¯ Vˆ W ‡
I¯c
+ PU¯⊥(Φ)W ‡I¯c − (∆2W ‡)I¯c‖∞,2
≤‖U¯ Vˆ W ‡
I¯c
‖∞,2 + ‖(I − U¯ U¯)†λHˆ(WTI¯ W ‡I¯)−1WTI¯ W ‡I¯c‖∞,2
+ ‖(∆2W ‡)I¯c‖∞,2
≤‖U¯‖‖Vˆ W ‡
I¯c
‖∞,2+
‖(I − U¯ U¯)†‖‖λHˆ‖‖(W †
I¯
WI¯)
−1‖‖WTI¯ W ‡I¯c‖∞,2+
‖(∆2W ‡)I¯c‖∞,2
≤ǫ+ λ
√
kσk
√
kµ+
λσk
√
k + (k2 − k)µ(ǫ+ σkµ
√
k + (k2 − k)µ)
1− ψ
≤(1 + 1
2− ψ˜ )(ǫ + λkσkµ),
≤(1 + 1
2− ψ˜ )(ǫ + λk˜σk˜µ), (59)
≤λ,
where the last inequality follows from λ ≥ λmin,k˜. Then (d)
of (34) holds.
E. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: We define
C˜ = C¯ +PI¯PU¯ (C∗ − C¯) and L˜ = L¯−PI¯PU¯ (C∗ − C¯)WT .
Note that PU¯ (L˜) = L˜, PI¯(C˜) = C˜ and L¯ + C¯WT = L˜ +
C˜WT . We further define NL = L∗ − L¯, NC = C∗ − C¯, and
N+C = C
∗ − C˜. Note that PI¯c(N+C ) = PI¯c(NC) from the
definition of N+C . Let E = NL +NCWT . We have
‖E‖F = ‖L∗ + C∗WT − (L¯+ C¯WT )‖F
≤‖L∗ + C∗WT −M‖F + ‖N‖F ≤ 2η, (60)
where the last inequality holds since (L∗, C∗) is the solution
to (13) and ‖N‖F ≤ η. Let G be such that ‖G‖ = 1,〈
G,PT∗⊥(∆WT )
〉
= ‖PT∗⊥(∆WT )‖∗ and PT∗(G) = 0. Let
F be such that Fi = ∆i/‖∆i‖2 if i ∈ I¯ and ∆i 6= 0, and
Fi = 0 otherwise. Then
‖L¯‖∗ + λ‖C¯‖1,2
(m)
≥ ‖L∗‖∗ + λ‖C∗‖1,2
(n)
≥‖L¯‖∗ + λ‖C¯‖1,2 + 〈PT¯ (Q) +G,NL〉+ λ〈PI¯(QW ‡)/λ
+ F,NC〉
=‖L¯‖∗ + λ‖C¯‖1,2 + ‖PT¯⊥(NL)‖∗ + 〈PT¯ (Q), NL〉
+ λ‖PI¯c(NC)‖1,2 + 〈PI¯(QW ‡), NC〉
=‖L¯‖∗ + λ‖C¯‖1,2 + ‖PT¯⊥(NL)‖∗ + λ‖PI¯c(NC)‖1,2
− 〈PT¯⊥(Q), NL〉 − 〈PI¯c(QW ‡), NC〉+ 〈Q,NL +NCWT 〉
≥‖L¯‖∗ + λ‖C¯‖1,2 + (1− ‖PT¯⊥(Q)‖)‖PT¯⊥(NL)‖∗
+ (λ− ‖PI¯c(QW ‡)‖∞,2)‖PI¯c(NC)‖1,2 + 〈Q,E〉
≥‖L¯‖∗ + λ‖C¯‖1,2 + 1
2
‖PT¯⊥(NL)‖∗ +
λ
2
‖PI¯c(NC)‖1,2
− 2η‖Q‖F ,
(61)
where (m) holds because of the optimality of (L∗, C∗) and
(n) holds because of the convexity of the objective function of
(13). We can see that the last inequality of (61) follows from
(b) and (d) of (42). Then we have
1
2
‖PT¯⊥(NL)‖∗ +
λ
2
‖PI¯c(NC)‖1,2 − 2η‖Q‖F ≤ 0. (62)
Note that
‖Q‖F = ‖PT¯ (Q) + PT¯⊥(Q)‖F
=
√
‖PT¯ (Q)‖2F + ‖PT¯⊥(Q)‖2F
=
√
‖U¯ V¯ †‖2F + ‖PT¯⊥(Q)‖2F
(o)
≤ 1
2
√
min(t, p) + 3r, (63)
where the last equality follows from (a) of (42). The inequality
(o) holds from ‖U¯ V¯ †‖F =
√
trace(V¯U¯†U¯V¯†) =
√
r, and
‖PT¯⊥(Q)‖F ≤ rank(PT¯⊥(Q))·‖PT¯⊥(Q)‖ ≤
√
min(t, p)− r
2
.
Since θ = min(t, p), combining (62) and (63), we have
‖PT¯⊥(NL)‖F ≤ ‖PT¯⊥(NL)‖∗ ≤ 2η
√
θ + 3r, (64)
‖PI¯c(NC)‖F ≤ ‖PI¯c(NC)‖1,2 ≤
2
λ
η
√
θ + 3r. (65)
From the definition of PWI¯ in (38), one can check that
PWI¯ (PI¯(W )T ) = PI¯(W )T . (66)
Then we have
PI¯(N+C )WT = PI¯(N+C )PI¯(W )T
=PI¯(N+C )PWI¯ (PI¯(W )T ) = PI¯(N+C )PWI¯ (WT )
=PWI¯ (N+CWT − PI¯c(N+C )WT )
(p)
=PWI¯ (E − PT¯⊥(NL)− PT¯ (NL)− PI¯PU¯ (NC)WT
− PI¯c(N+C )WT )
(q)
=PWI¯ (E − PT¯⊥(NL)− PT¯ (E) + PT¯ (NCWT )
− PI¯PU¯ (NC)WT − PI¯c(N+C )WT )
=PWI¯ (PT¯⊥(E)− PT¯⊥(NL)− PI¯c(NC)WT
+ PT¯ (PI¯(NC)WT ) + PT¯ (PI¯c(NC)WT )
− PI¯PU¯ (NC)WT )
(r)
=PWI¯ (PT¯⊥(E)− PT¯⊥(NL)− PI¯c(NC)WT+
PT¯ (PI¯c(NC)WT ) + PU¯ (PI¯(NC)WT )+
PV¯ (PI¯(NC)PI¯(W )T )− PU¯PV¯ (PI¯(NC)WT )
− PI¯PU¯ (NC)WT )
(s)
=PWI¯ (PT¯⊥(E)− PT¯⊥(NL)− PI¯c(NC)WT+
PT¯ (PI¯c(NC)WT ) + PV¯ (NCPI¯(W )T )− PV¯ (PI¯c(NC)
PI¯(W )T )− PU¯PV¯ (PI¯(NC)WT ))
(t)
=PWI¯ (PT¯⊥(E)− PT¯⊥(NL)− PI¯c(NC)WT+
PT¯ (PI¯c(NC)WT ) + PV¯ (N+CPI¯(W )T )). (67)
where (p) and (q) follow from the definition E = NL+NCWT
and N+C = NC − PI¯PU¯ (NC). (r) follows the definition of
PT¯ . (s) holds because PU¯ (PI¯(NC)WT ) = PI¯PU¯ (NC)WT .
(t) holds because of the equality (68) shown as follows:
PV¯ (NCPI¯(W )T )− PU¯PV¯ (PI¯(NC)PI¯(W )T )
=PV¯ (NCPI¯(W )T − PI¯PU¯ (NC)PI¯(W )T )
=PV¯ (N+C PI¯(W )T )
(68)
Note that
‖PWI¯PV¯ (N+CPI¯(W )T )‖F
=‖PWI¯PV¯ (N+CPWI¯PI¯(W )T )‖F
=‖N+CPI¯(W )TW ‡I¯(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ V¯ V¯
†W ‡
I¯
(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ ‖F
(u)
≤‖N+CPI¯(W )T ‖F‖V¯ †W ‡I¯(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ V¯ ‖
=‖N+CPI¯(W )T ‖F‖V¯ V¯ †W ‡I¯(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ V¯ V¯
†‖
=ψ‖PI¯(N+C )WT ‖F ≤ ψ˜‖PI¯(N+C )WT ‖F ,
where the first equality holds from (66), and (u) holds because
‖AB‖F ≤ ‖A‖F‖B‖ and ‖A†A‖ = ‖AA†‖ for matrices A
and B. From (67), we have
‖PI¯(N+C )WT ‖F
≤(‖PT¯⊥(E)‖F + ‖PT¯⊥(NL)‖F + ‖PT¯⊥(PI¯c(NC)WT )‖F )
‖W ‡
I¯
(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1WTI¯ ‖+ ψ˜‖PI¯(N+C )WT ‖F
≤‖E‖F + ‖PT¯⊥(NL)‖F + ‖PI¯c(NC)‖F ‖W‖+
ψ˜‖PI¯(N+C )WT ‖F , (69)
where the last inequality uses the property that
‖W ‡
I¯
(WT
I¯
W ‡
I¯
)−1WT
I¯
‖ = 1. From similar arguments as
in (51), we have ‖W‖ ≤ √1 + (n− 1)µ. Then combining
(60), (64), (65), and (69), we obtain
‖PI¯(N+C )WT ‖F ≤ (1 +
λ+
√
1 + (n− 1)µ
λ
√
θ + 3r)
2η
1− ψ˜ .
(70)
Furthermore,
‖PI¯(N+C )‖F = ‖PI¯(N+C )WTW ‡I¯(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1‖F
≤‖PI¯(N+C )WT ‖F‖W ‡I¯‖‖(WTI¯ W
‡
I¯
)−1‖
≤(1 + λ+
√
1 + (n− 1)µ
λ
√
θ + 3r)
2ησk
√
1 + (k − 1)µ
1− ψ˜ ,
where the last inequality follows from (70), (51), and (18). We
also have
‖N+CWT ‖F = ‖PI¯c(NC)WT + PI¯(N+C )WT ‖F
≤‖PI¯c(NC)WT ‖F + ‖PI¯(N+C )WT ‖F
≤‖PI¯c(NC)‖F ‖W‖+ ‖PI¯(N+C )WT ‖F
≤(1 + λ+ (2− ψ˜)
√
1 + (n− 1)µ
λ
√
θ + 3r)
2η
1− ψ˜ .
Finally, we have
‖C∗ − C˜‖F = ‖PI¯c(NC) + PI¯(N+C )‖F
≤‖PI¯c(NC)‖F + ‖PI¯(N+C )‖F
≤(1 + (λ+
√
1 + (n− 1)µ
λ
+
1− ψ˜
λσk
√
1 + (k − 1)µ )
√
θ + 3r)
2ησk
√
1 + (k − 1)µ
1− ψ˜ ,
and
‖L∗ − L˜‖F = ‖L∗ − L¯+ C˜WT − C¯WT ‖F
=‖L∗ − L¯+ C∗WT − C¯WT + C˜WT − C∗WT ‖F
=‖E −N+CWT ‖F ≤ ‖E‖F + ‖N+CWT ‖F
≤(2 − ψ˜ + λ+ (2− ψ˜)
√
1 + (n− 1)µ
λ
√
θ + 3r)
2η
1− ψ˜ .
F. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: Since equalities (a) and (c) of (42) are the same
as those in (34) and the construction of Q remains the same,
then (a) and (c) of (42) have been proved in step 1 and 3 of
the proof of Lemma 4. We only need to show that (b) and
(d) hold when λ belongs to [λ′
min,k˜, λ
′
max,k˜
]. From (55), that
is proved in the proof of Lemma 4, and λ ≤ λ′
max,k˜
, we have
‖PT ′⊥(Q)‖ ≤
2− ψ˜
1− ψ˜ λσk˜
√
k˜ + (k˜2 − k˜)µ ≤ 1
2
.
From (59) and λ ≥ λ′
min,k˜, we have
‖(QW ‡)I¯c‖∞,2 ≤ (1 +
1
2− ψ˜ )(ǫ + λk˜σk˜µ) ≤
λ
2
.
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